The ballad of financial dependency: sponsoring in public health professional societies by Razum, Oliver et al.
n 
 
 
 
 
 
Razum, O., Bozorgmehr, K., Wenner, J., and Weishaar, H. (2015) The ballad of 
financial dependency: sponsoring in public health professional societies. European 
Journal of Public Health, 25(5), pp. 754-755. 
 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/111651/ 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 29 February 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
1 
 
The Ballad of Financial Dependency: sponsoring in public health professional societies 
Oliver Razum1, Kayvan Bozorgmehr2, Judith Wenner1, Heide Weishaar3 
 
Authors’ affiliations: 
1. School of Public Health, Dept. of Epidemiology & International Public Health, Bielefeld University, 
Germany 
2. Faculty of Medicine, Dept. of General Practice & Health Services Research, University of 
Heidelberg, Germany  
3. MRC/CSO Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of Glasgow, UK 
 
Corresponding author: 
Oliver Razum 
School of Public Health, Bielefeld University 
Dept. of Epidemiology & International Public Health 
P.O. Box 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany 
oliver.razum@uni-bielefeld.de  
Phone : + 49 521 106 3837 
 
Funding: none 
Conflict of Interest: HW and OR attended one or more EUPHA/EPH conferences; OR and KB attended 
one WFPHA World Congress.  
  
2 
 
The Ballad of Financial Dependency: sponsoring in public health professional societies 
 
The European Public Health Association (EUPHA) has become one of the leading voices of public 
health in Europe. Its annual European Public Health Conference (EPH), jointly organised with the 
Association of Schools of Public Health in Europe (ASPHER), is now the main platform for direct 
exchange between scientists and public health practitioners. This is good. And yet there remains a 
constant irritant, repeatedly discussed in EUPHA boards, covered by a detailed “Code of Conduct”,1 
and still not resolved to everybody’s satisfaction: the issue of industry sponsoring, in particular by the 
pharmaceutical sector. ASPHER, the World Federation of Public Health Associations (WFPHA)2 and 
many national public health professional societies face similar challenges. 
Where we see a problem 
EUPHA regularly accepts pharmaceutical industry support (usually as unrestricted grants) in the 
context of the EPH conferences. In 2014, for example, two vaccine manufacturers supported pre-
conference activities on vaccination which were promoted in the conference programme booklet. 
WFPHA and the Indian Public Health Association (IPHA) invite prospective sponsors of the 2015 
World Congress on Public Health to “impact [their] target audience” by covering travel expenses for 
keynote speakers and “nutrition breaks” of delegates. Moreover, for a contribution of 40,000 US$, 
WFPHA/IPHA offer to endorse sponsors as “Public Health Champions”.3 
Public health professionals who support such practice argue that professional attitudes and 
behaviours will not be influenced by industry funding.1 Others perceive pharmaceutical industry 
sponsorship as indispensable to run large European conferences successfully and support 
participants from less wealthy countries. Some argue that vaccination is inherently beneficial, and 
that sponsoring from vaccine manufacturers thus is unproblematic. 
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We disagree. Public health experts, the participants of these (pre-)conferences, are stakeholders, e.g. 
in the evaluation and distribution of vaccines. Their opinion is decisive and has to be impartial. 
Accepting sponsoring from pharmaceutical companies creates conflicts of interest and endangers the 
actual or perceived independence of professional societies and its members. Moreover, as 
sponsoring is booked as operating expenses (or donations) that lead to tax reductions for companies, 
it decreases tax revenues and shifts funding from state to industry, reducing democratic control and 
accountability in the process.  
On accepting gifts 
Sponsoring is a primarily social exchange, comparable to gifts that hosts of dinner invitations receive 
from their guests. Gifts foster a need to reciprocate and diminish the recipients’ ability to remain 
objective. Even though gifts are perceived as voluntary and trivial, “in fact they are given and repaid 
under obligation”.4 Sponsoring has thus an affective component. While the recipient may fail to 
perceive or rationalize the affective nature of sponsoring, it will almost inevitably unfold its 
emotional effect. Despite the overwhelming evidence of the impact of gift-giving generally and 
pharmaceutical industry sponsorship more specifically, professionals who engage in interactions with 
industry still seem to be prone to denial: they perceive a “sense of invulnerability to the biasing 
effects of conflicts of interest”,5 and are convinced that the funding they benefit from does not 
influence their attitudes or behaviours. This is a naïve assumption. Commercial funding of medical 
and public health research (even if indirect and pooled) increases the reporting of pro-industry 
findings and promotion of industry-favoured solutions and commercial products. 
Vested commercial interests 
Pharmaceutical industry has massive economic interests at stake which may compel it to influence 
public health professionals, their research, and their decisions – in particular since blockbuster drugs 
have become a rarity. Three developments call for critical scrutiny: 
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Firstly, pharmaceutical industry is increasingly placing its bet on new diagnostics, including 
personalized medicine and public health genomics. Companies are well aware that it will be the 
public health community who is going to assess effectiveness and cost-benefit of such innovations. 
Secondly, pharmaceutical industry attempts to medicalize minor ailments and offer pharmacological 
solutions for them. This “corporate construction of disease” is promoted by engaging in health 
education, funding of conferences and influencing public and academic debate.6 These two 
developments threaten to shift the focus from population health strategies, aimed at increasing 
overall population health and narrowing health inequalities, to individualised medicine and 
pharmacological solutions. 
Thirdly, transnational pharmaceutical corporations are increasingly concerned with political 
questions relevant to public health, impinging e.g. on the Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); their objectives are thus at odds with important public health 
goals. 
“He who pays the piper calls the tune” 
The public expects professional societies to take a leadership role in promoting public health, 
defining best practice, and providing impartial guidance. The scientific credibility of the public health 
community is at stake if we accept sponsoring from industry or organizations whose products or 
technologies we are supposed to critically assess. Even if professional societies act within the legal 
boundaries and according to their codes of conduct, the mere appearance of corruptibility has the 
potential to cause considerable damage. 
EUPHA and other public health associations have had extensive discussions on sponsoring, but these 
need to continue. Their codes of good practice need to acknowledge that the interests of 
pharmaceutical companies (as well as of processed food and soft drinks companies) and those of 
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public health are often misaligned. To preclude the impression of financial dependency, public health 
associations should take corrective action and: 
• fully disclose the amounts of all commercial donations, sponsorship and direct funding 
received; 
• publish the budget of conferences; 
• discontinue the current practice of promoting industry-sponsored pre-conference activities, 
endorsing industry sponsors, and inviting them to support travel or subsistence of delegates; 
• adopt a policy of €0 industry funding by 2020; and in the meantime, restrict industry 
sponsoring to advertising pages in journals and conference programmes which are clearly 
marked as marketing activities; 
• annually disclose their council and board members’ financial links with industry (or the 
absence of these) on their organization’s websites; 
• use their political clout to argue that restricting sponsorship and replacing it by public 
funding is in the public interest as it will help to keep public health research and decision-
making impartial. 
Enacting these suggestions may require public health associations to change their mode of 
operation. Some activities, particularly in the context of conferences, may have to be discontinued 
due to a lack of financial resources. If public health associations decide not to reject sponsoring, they 
should at least be completely frank and honest – merely declaring a potential conflict of interest will 
not suffice. Professional societies which accept industry sponsoring need to explain to the public that 
doing so is likely to affect their judgment; and that their advice in matters relevant to public health 
must therefore be taken with a pinch of salt. 
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